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Book Reviews: InternationalRelations
others, trade is dominatedby long-termcontractsso that there is no singleprice structure
to guidestabilizationschemes;and in yet other
cases productsare sensitive to price competition from syntheticsor are producedin many
grades that are difficult to classify and regulate. Whateverthe specificreason,pricestabilization schemes often confront economic
obstaclesthat reinforcethe political obstacles
discussedabove.
All of these factors and many more are addressed in Finlayson and Zacher's analysis,
which makes a valuable contributionboth to
the literatureon North-Southcommoditybargaining and to the broader theoreticalliteratureof the field of internationalpoliticaleconomy. Either contribution would have been
welcome, but the authors'success in linking
the two makes Managing International
Marketsan especiallyimpressiveachievement.
VINCENTA. MAHLER

Loyola University,Chicago
NATO'sConventionalDefenses.By StephenJ.
Flanagan.Cambridge,MA: Ballinger,1988.
172p. $34.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.
The Politicsof EuropeanDefenseCooperation:
Germany,France,Britain,and America.By
David Garnham. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988. 224p. $29.95.
After forty-five years the invasion of West
Germanyfrom the Easthas finally begun. But
contraryto the fears of Westerndefense analysts, it is an invasion of cars and pedestrians,
not of tanks, that is joyously breachingthe
BerlinWall. Unfortunately,NATO's fortieth
anniversarycame too soon, stimulatinga raft
of scholarshipthat may now need to be reworked in the light of momentous recent
events in EasternEurope.
Works by Flanaganand Garnhamrespond
to the question,How can Europebe defended
in the comingera of decliningU.S. hegemony
and of Europeanreluctanceto employ nuclear
weaponsto fightwars?The authorsrespondin
differentways. Garnhamfocuses on European
defensecooperationas a way of enhancingthe
role Europeanpowers can play in their own
defense, particularlyin the managementof
nuclearrisks. Flanaganexplores the question
much more broadly, examiningthe prospects
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for evolving a consensus on more effective
strategiesand tactics, on reformsin European
conventionaldefense,and on cooperation.But
the uniquenessof this book is his attentionto
technology,particularlyto nonnuclearemerging technologies,as a meansof maintainingan
acceptablebalance and of increasingstability
in times of crisis.
Both works are thoughtful,clearlywritten,
and rich in their scholarship.Both illuminate
key areas of basic knowledge well. Flanagan
shinesin his discussionof strategy,notably of
differentconceptionsof "deepstrike"strategies
includingFollowon ForcesAttack (FOFA)and
in his brief overview of the technologiesthat
might supportthem. Garnhampresentsan excellent succinctdiscussionof bilateraldefense
policy relations between the principalactors
(the United States, Britain, France, and the
FederalRepublicof Germany)and offersa useful introductionto the possibilitiesand limitations of multilateraldefense cooperation as
well. Garnham'sbook, althoughit may be too
basic for scholars, is a good candidate for
assignment to advanced undergraduatesor
graduatestudents.Flanagan'swork, as part of
the InternationalInstitutefor StrategicStudies
series, is geared more to specialists and
assumes knowledge that may stretch general
readers(MLRS,for example,is neverdefined).
Events subsequentto the writing of these
works-the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces(INF)Treaty,changesin Sovietmilitary
doctrine, and the startling developments in
EasternEurope-have shiftedthe groundconsiderablysincetheseprojectswereundertaken.
In termsof these works the developmentsare
fortuitous, for neitherauthor has produceda
convincing answer to the basic question of
how a viable defense of Europe can be
achieved in the politicostrategicclimate they
describe. Garnham demonstratesthat European Defense Cooperationhas been growing
but that cooperationalso contains irreconcilable problems. These problemsare traced to
nationalpreferencesto limit coproductionfor
national economic reasons that include the
developmentof nationaltechnologicalcompetence. They are also rooted in the fact that
faced with any realrisk of war with the Soviet
Union, the FederalRepublic,and Britainprefer
to link their fate to the United States rather
thanto eachotherand to France.YetGarnham
concludeshis book with the recommendation
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that Europeanstake on more of the role of the
nuclearguarantorand that the United States
retaina significantrole in supportingconventional defense. Given political sensitivitiesin
Germanyabout the use of nuclearweaponsfor
any purpose other than deterrence,this realignment of alliance tasks seems highly
unlikely.In fact, it may only prove feasiblein
a context of a greatly reducedassessmentof
the Soviet threat;for as Trevertonhas wisely
pointed out in a recent Council on Foreign
Relations book, WesternApproaches to the
Soviet Union (1988), at very low levels of risk
one becomesless finicky about the ensure. In
this evolving context West Germany might
even be willing to bet its fate on a "European
pillar"dependentlargely on a Frenchnuclear
guarantee.In this new context Garnhammay
be correct to dispel the fear of German"Finlandization" or "equidistancing"that the
Frenchand U.S. observersassociate with improved inter-Germanrelations. Given the extreme political weakness and prospect for
chaos in the East, Germanywould have little
difficulty deciding to stay "anchored"in the
West.
Flanagan'sargumentis more cautious and
nuanced. After reviewing NATOCsforward
defense strategiesand arguing that emerging
technologiesto enhance firepowercountering
numericallysuperiorforcescouldbe very helpful, he leads us to understandthat for largely
technicalreasonsthese very technologiesoffer
littleprospectof successin the nearterm.Flanagan wisely incorporatespolitical and economic considerationsas well. Rejectingemerging technologiesas a "magicbullet," he concludesthat NATO can only make incremental
improvementsin defenseof its territory-and
then only if Europeans believe that these
changes will not increasetheir financialburden, increasethe risk that deterrencewill fail
(as some perceivelonger-rangeapplicationsof
FOFAmay), and will not weaken the linkage
to the U.S. nuclear guarantee. These are
modest opportunitiesindeed. Fortunately,in
the emergingcontext, even these modest gains
may seem sufficient; and the fixation of the
U.S. guaranteemay decline as a criterion.
While timing has ultimately helped both
authors'arguments,it has also been unkindin
two significantways. Both books would have
been better for being able to consider from
some distancethe defense policy implications
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of the INF agreementand the unfoldingConventionalForcesTalks. Both suffer,as well, in
their discussionsof Frenchdefensepolicy, for
not having had access to Richard Ullman's
revelations(ForeignPolicy [1989])of 15 years
of close Franco-American
nuclearcooperation.
This must certainlyalter how we understand
the roles French conventional and nuclear
forceswould likelyplay in a Europeanwar. Errors in timing, however, are inevitablein this
fast-movingand fascinatingfield.
B. CHARUCK
ROBERT
ClevelandState University
The Weary Titan: Britainand the Experience
of RelativeDecline, 1895-1905. By Aaron
L. Friedberg.Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1988. 329p. $29.95.
Aaron Friedberghas written an important
book on Britishimperialdeclinethat indirectly
illuminates a question of current public
debate-the United States'experienceof relative decline. Those who are concernedeither
with the historicalcase or its presentanalogue
will profit from the acuity with which Friedbergposes his questionsand the subtletyof his
historicalnarrative.Not everyone, however,
will be convincedthat he has successfullychallenged the conventional wisdom that Britain
reacted adeptly to the problems of imperial
decline.
This conventionalview, as Friedbergaccurately lays it out (pp. 292-95), is that Britain
clearly understood its situation of relative
economicand imperialdeclinearoundthe turn
of the century and rationally engaged in a
triage of its excessive internationalcommitments. Britain'sastute strategy of appeasing
most of its potential enemies, switchingfrom
"splendidisolation"to loose alliancesto contain Germanpower, helps explain "why the
Britishempire lasted so long"-as Paul Kennedy has put it. By implication,Britain'ssuccessful strategicretrenchmentis a model for a
similar strategy on the part of the United
States.
Friedbergchallengesthis view, arguingthat
Britain understood the reality of its relative
declinein only a haltingand partialway. Due
in part to this intellectualfailurein measuring
its power in the economic and military

